The Political Economy of EU Climate and Energy Policies in Central and Eastern Europe Revisited: Shifting Coalitions and Prospects for Clean Energy Transitions by Ćetković, Stefan & Buzogány, Aron
www.ssoar.info
The Political Economy of EU Climate and Energy
Policies in Central and Eastern Europe Revisited:
Shifting Coalitions and Prospects for Clean Energy
Transitions
Ćetković, Stefan; Buzogány, Aron
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ćetković, S., & Buzogány, A. (2019). The Political Economy of EU Climate and Energy Policies in Central and Eastern
Europe Revisited: Shifting Coalitions and Prospects for Clean Energy Transitions. Politics and Governance, 7(1),
124-138. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i1.1786
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 124–138
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i1.1786
Article
The Political Economy of EU Climate and Energy Policies in Central and
Eastern Europe Revisited: Shifting Coalitions and Prospects for Clean
Energy Transitions
Stefan Ćetković 1,* and Aron Buzogány 2
1 Environmental and Climate Policy Chair, Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich, 80333 Munich,
Germany; E-Mail: stefan.cetkovic@hfp.tum.de
2 Institute of Forest, Environmental and Natural Resource Policy, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, 1180
Vienna, Austria; E-Mail: aron.buzogany@boku.ac.at
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 17 October 2018 | Accepted: 24 January 2019 | Published: 28 March 2019
Abstract
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have commonly been regarded as climate and energy policy laggards
blocking more ambitious EU decarbonization targets. Although recent literature has increasingly acknowledged the differ-
ences in national positions on energy and climate issues among these states, there has been little comprehensive evidence
about their positioning on EU climate and energy policies and the domestic interests which shape government preferences.
The article addresses this gap by tracing the voting behavior of six CEE countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, and Romania) on EU energy-related legislation in the Council of Ministers between 2007–2018. The article shows
that the contestation of energy policies, particularly of climate-related legislation, in the Council of Ministers has increased
over time and that these six CEE countries have indeed most often objected to the adoption of EU legislation. The CEE
states do not, however, have a common regional positioning on all EU energy policies. Voting coalitions among the six CEE
countries differ substantially across energy policy areas. The lack of a common regional position and changing national
preferences have enabled the adoption of a relatively ambitious EU Energy and Climate Package for 2030. The differences
in national voting patterns are explained by the evolving interests and the ability of key domestic political and economic
actors to adapt to and explore benefits from the ever-expanding EU energy and climate policies.
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1. Introduction
During the last decade, formulating a common and com-
prehensive European Union (EU) energy policy has re-
quired the traversing of a long and bumpy road. EU
member states have incorporated their previously inde-
pendently pursued policy goals of energy security, en-
ergy market integration, and decarbonization under a
single framework with the publication of the Energy
Union Strategy in 2015 (Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg, &
Sartor, 2016). Among the different policy dimensions
of the Energy Union, energy sector decarbonization has
been the most dynamic but also the most contested pol-
icy area (Skjærseth, Eikeland, Gulbrandsen, & Jevnaker,
2016). The EU’s climate and energy policy framework
was first enacted in 2009 laying out the 2020 goals in the
areas of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and green-
house gas emissions reductions. The latter was to be
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achieved mainly through the Emission Trading Scheme
(ETS). The EU has made considerable progress in meet-
ing its 2020 climate and energy targets, triggering far-
reaching policy change at the national level (Jörgens &
Solorio, 2017). However, the difficulties in policy imple-
mentation and the opposition from domestic vested in-
terests have led to increasing resistance among some
member states against further expansion of EU energy
and climate policy and more ambitious post-2020 tar-
gets. The six Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries (four Visegrad countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia
and Czech Republic, together with Bulgaria and Roma-
nia) in particular have been described as climate and
energy policy laggards opposing stricter EU goals in
the decarbonization of the energy sector (Braun, 2014;
Skjærseth, 2018).
Despite growing national reluctance, the adoption of
the bold ETS reform and several pieces of legislation un-
der the 2030 climate and energy framework during 2018
signify a deepening and broadening of EU integration in
this area. The new EU energy efficiency target has been
set to 32.5% (up from the original 27% agreed in 2014)
and the new Renewable Energy Directive features a 32%
EU target (up from 27% agreed in 2014) together with
the EU-wide regulation which grants a preferential treat-
ment for prosumers and community-owned projects (Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2018a, 2018b). Even if the lack of
national renewable energy targets is clearly a setback
compared to the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, a
new governance mechanism for the Energy Union has
been put in place to ensure effective monitoring and
policy implementation at the national level (Council of
the EU, 2018a). The policy process has thus been a rela-
tive success, particularly in view of the modest ambition
and political saturation signaled by the European Coun-
cil in 2014 (General Secretariat of the Council, 2014).
This raises the question about the reasons behind the re-
cent positive policy developments and the lessons to be
drawn for the future of the Energy Union and national
clean energy transitions.
Given that the six CEE countries have been the main
opponents of EU energy and climate policies, we ex-
pect that the progress in EU energy and climate inte-
gration has been related to the weakening of the com-
mon position among the six CEE countries in this policy
field. While earlier literature rarely differentiated among
CEE countries and their energy sectors and suggested
that they share a homogeneous view on EU energy and
climate issues (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2016; Skjærseth,
2016; Skjærseth et al., 2016), differences within this
group have been acknowledged more recently (Bocquil-
lon & Maltby, 2017; Mišík, 2017; Nosko & Mišík, 2017).
However, no comprehensive evidence has been offered
so far on the national positions of the CEE countries on
EU energy and climate policies, how these have changed
over time, their implications for EU decision-making, and
possible reasons behind the stability and change in na-
tional positions.
We argue that different national adaptation capaci-
ties, in terms of ability and willingness of domestic en-
ergy business interests and governments in the six CEE
countries to adapt to the new incentives and opportuni-
ties offered by different EU energy and climate policies,
have led to the divergence of interests and weakening
of a common regional position. This, in turn, has made
policy progress at the EU level more politically feasible.
To test our assumption, we analyze the voting patterns
of the six CEE governments in the Council of Ministers
(the Council) in the period 2007–2018. We are particu-
larly interested in climate-related energy legislation (e.g.,
ETS reform, renewable energy, energy efficiency) but we
also consider legislations in other energy-related issue ar-
eas, such as energy air pollution or energy security, to
obtain a comprehensive picture. In the first step, we ask
whether the six CEE governments have indeed increas-
ingly objected to EU energy legislation in the Council and
whether the six CEE governments have displayed a com-
mon or diverging voting behavior across different energy
issue areas. In the second step, we offer some evidence
on the reasons behind the common and/or diverging vot-
ing patterns of the six CEE countries by focusing on do-
mestic vested interests and drawing on the insights from
political economy and energy transitions studies.
The article advances the understanding of EU climate
and energy policy integration and the role of the six
CEE governments in affecting EU climate and energy ef-
forts while also contributing to the broader literature on
decision-making and policy change in the EU. Further-
more, we draw policy-relevant conclusions from the in-
terplay between EU policies and domestic structures for
the future prospects of the Energy Union and of national
clean energy transitions.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Post-Accession Decision-Making in EU Energy and
Climate Policy
With the eastern enlargement having almost doubled
the number of EU member states, decision-making in
the EU Council was expected to become more compli-
cated or to leave EU institutions gridlocked (Börzel &
Buzogány, 2019; Hertz & Leuffen, 2011). A decade later,
the evidence remains mixed. Some argue that eastern
enlargement has led to a new East-West cleavage in the
Council (Mattila, 2009) and that different factors, such as
voteweight, budget benefits from the EU, or government
positions (left-right, EU integration), are driving voting
behavior in old and new member states (Hosli, Mattila,
& Uriot, 2011). Other authors note that the paralysis
in EU decision-making that was awaited as a result of
eastern enlargement did not materialize (Hagemann &
de Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Parízek, Hosli, & Plechanovová,
2015; Toshkov, 2017).While the success of pre-accession
conditionality or post-accession socialization might par-
tially explain this, the new member states’ policy prefer-
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ences were unclear or matched already existing conflict
lines within the Council. Adding to this, institutional so-
lutions, such as delegation to lower echelons of decision-
making, have helped to avoid gridlock (König & Junge,
2009; Parízek et al., 2015).
More attention is needed related to the issue-
specific preferences guiding governments’ voting be-
havior (Bailer, Mattila, & Schneider, 2015; Høyland &
Hansen, 2013; Mühlböck & Tosun, 2017). This reinforces
arguments made by liberal intergovernmentalist schol-
arship that member states seek to protect their regula-
tory systems from costs incurred on them by EU law and
that governmental positionsmostly reflect key economic
players’ interests (Moravcsik, 1993; Naurin, 2018). While
these positions might be covered by partisan differences
as reflected in governments’ left-right orientations, sec-
toral perspectives should provide more nuanced views
on conflict in the Council (see Mühlböck & Tosun, 2017;
Roos, 2018).
The literature provides some evidence that the level
of conflict along the East–West divide is higher for en-
vironmental, energy, and climate change policies than
in other policy fields. In his examination of general pat-
terns of EU-level decision-making, Toshkov (2017) found
no evidence of new conflict lines emerging after east-
ern enlargement, but pointed to emerging differences
regarding environmental and climate policies as well on
migration issues. Case studies also suggest that energy
policy has been a policy field where CEE countries “devel-
oped quite clear sets of preferences…, contrary to many
other issues where they have very limited or no prefer-
ences at all” (Mišík, 2015, p. 6) and have watered down
climate and energy policy initiatives at the EU level by
opposing stronger regulations (Braun, 2014; Ydersbond,
2018). Changes in EU agendas have partially occurred to
accommodate the concerns of CEE states (Bocquillon &
Maltby, 2017; Skjærseth, 2018). Bocquillon and Maltby
(2017) show that, even though there is strong internal
coordination in the region and increasing opposition to-
wards EU climate and energy policies, the CEE states nev-
ertheless cannot be regarded as a homogeneous block in
the shape and intensity this opposition takes.
While much of the literature suggests that CEE coun-
tries are likely to converge in contesting ambitious EU cli-
mate and energy goals, in this article, we build on work
by Bocquillon and Maltby (2017) in that we trace the
possible differences in national positions and divergence
in voting patterns among the six CEE countries. We ad-
vance the debate by not only extending the temporal
perspective to the decade 2007–2018, but also by in-
cluding different policy dimensions in the “interrelated
sectors of EU energy and climate change” (Bocquillon &
Maltby, 2017, p. 88) as witnessed in the Council’s voting
records. The existing literature offers only scarce knowl-
edge about the reasons behind the diverging positions of
the six CEE governments on EU energy issues. We seek
to close this gap by paying closer attention to the key do-
mestic interests and their evolution. In the following sec-
tion, we highlight how domestic energy structures and
interests might explain decision-making at the EU level.
2.2. Political-Economy and Domestic Climate and Energy
Preferences in CEE
Following the seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001) on
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC), scholarly attempts have
been made to expand the binary typology differentiat-
ing between Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Coordi-
nated Market Economy (CME). For the CEE region, Nölke
and Vliegenhart (2009) identified a distinct type of politi-
cal economywhich they termedDependentMarket Econ-
omy (DME). The development model of DMEs is primar-
ily driven by foreign capital and the exceptional role of
transnational corporations (TNCs) moving their product
assembling activities to CEE countries, attracted by their
low labor costs, relatively skilled workers, and favorable
tax regimes. In addition, DMEs have significantly lower
transparency, more centralized decision-making, higher
political party clientelism, and higher corruption levels
than in Western Europe, undermining the governing ca-
pacity of the state and its ability to purposefully engage
in transforming the domestic economy (Innes, 2016).
The political-economic model of CEE countries is
matched by the similar structures of their industrial
and energy systems. Previous research has shown that
the DME model has produced dysfunctional patterns
in promoting new low-carbon technologies (Ćetković
& Buzogány, 2016). Nevertheless, the commonalities
among DMEs should not divert attention from important
cross-country differences both in terms of the broader
political-economic landscape, but especially concerning
the institutions, interests, and material base of the en-
ergy sector. While the VoC framework offers important
insights into the institutional structure and logic of the
six CEE economies, different strands of the political econ-
omy literature make us attentive to national- and sector-
specific vested interests and institutions as key factors
affecting domestic political processes and their inter-
national implications (Katzenstein, 1976). One key in-
sight borrowed from these approaches is that the inher-
ited socio-political structures and vested economic inter-
ests will resist or at least try to modify policy reforms
that go against domestic interests. The literature on sus-
tainability transitions and socio-technological transfor-
mation in the energy sector also emphasizes the role
of prevailing interests, ideas, and resources which form
the so-called socio-technological regime in the energy
sector (Kern, 2011). These approaches highlight the sta-
ble, path-dependent nature of energy regimes, which
therefore require endogenous or exogenous pressures
in order to enable socio-technological change (Lock-
wood, Kuzemko, Mitchell, & Hoggett, 2017). As implied
by the literature on multi-level reinforcement (Schreurs
& Tiberghien, 2007), the EU has an in-built affinity to-
wards ever-ambitious climate and energy policy, and the
ability of reluctant national interests to resist this pro-
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cess might be constrained by the powerful coalition of
‘environmental leaders’, the Council’s consensus-seeking
culture, or side-payments received in other policy ar-
eas. Another crucial point, elaborated upon in the liter-
atures on policy feedback and policy diffusion, is the dy-
namic and self-reinforcing nature of the policy process
itself. Although negative policy implementation experi-
ence can deter national actors and augment policy re-
sistance (Skjærseth, 2018), previously implemented EU
policies are also likely to create unanticipated benefits
(Skogstad, 2017) which in turn can affect domestic pref-
erences and power-constellations and, ultimately, accel-
erate policy change.
In sum,whereas the less technologically and econom-
ically advanced energy sectors in the six CEE countries
are not likely to embrace more ambitious EU energy and
climate policies, a more differentiated response by do-
mestic actors is to be expected over time. We expect
that the ability of national energy regimes to adapt to
and to embrace new energy and climate policies is con-
tingent upon a number of factors in both the state and
market spheres. On the state side, energy policy priori-
ties and the ability of the state to impose them on the
energy sector are central. In DMEs, governments are
particularly concerned with energy security and afford-
ability of energy prices for the industry and households.
While the state’s ability to steer the clean energy transi-
tion is limited and the risk of policy capture by domestic
vested interests is high, the dependence on foreign in-
vestments may motivate these governments to embrace
the EU policy framework and to open the market in new
low-carbon sectors. The recent ‘illiberal’ trend that has
gained ground in some CEE countries like Poland and
Hungary (Appel & Orenstein, 2018; Buzogány, 2017) pro-
vides further insights into the role states can play in shap-
ing the energy transition. Democratic backsliding and
creeping authoritarianism are related to the dependence
of these countries on foreign firms and capital as well
as the domestic elites’ efforts to counter this through re-
gaining control over ‘strategic’ political and economic re-
sources (Scheiring, 2018). To the extent that illiberal ten-
dencies prevail in the region, this may imply less open-
ness towards foreign investments in renewable energy
projects and increasing state influence over the energy
sector. On the market side, the concentration of domes-
tic energy business interests, their economic and tech-
nological capacity to take advantage of new energy and
climate policies, as well as the level of the technologi-
cal lock-in in fossil-fuel energy sources, should all be key
economic factors determining governmental positions
towards EU energy and climate policies.
Overall, the literature suggests that national govern-
ments and energy sectors will be under increasing pres-
sure to adapt to the evolving EU energy and climate poli-
cies and that dynamic state-market constellations will
determine national preferences on a given policy issue.
Although preference formation at the national level is
likely to vary across policy issues, in general we expect
that strong illiberal trends, higher dependence on con-
ventional fossil-fuels, and more concentrated and less
adaptive capacity on the part of domestic energy indus-
tries are likely to lead governments to oppose or abstain
from energy legislation in the Council.
3. Research Design and Data
This contribution investigates the six CEE countries’ posi-
tions on EU energy legislation based on voting behavior
in the Council. As already noted, the energy policy field
under the framework of the Energy Union is relatively
broad and includes several different policy dimensions
(security, affordability, sustainability) as well as multiple
policy areas. For the sake of comprehensiveness, in our
analysis, we consider all EU legislation related to the en-
ergy sector, including that which does not relate directly
to the core issues of the Energy Union, such as air pol-
lution from energy combustion. We also include sustain-
able transportation policies, as they are tightly linked to
EU energy decarbonizationmeasures. A broader view on
different energy-related policy areas allows for amore ro-
bust comparison and gives insights into the variations of
voting behavior and the possible interests behind these.
We use the data on voting on Council decisions pub-
lished in the Council Secretariat’s ‘Monthly Summary of
Council Acts’ reports. Council voting records are widely
used in the literature studying national positions and in-
fluence in decision-making (Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila,
2004; Toshkov, 2017). Although many issues are typically
settled among EU institutions and actors before official
voting in the Council takes place, previous research has
shown that governments regularly use their votes in the
Council to express their disagreement with the agreed
legislation as a signal to both domestic and EU-level ac-
tors (Hagemann, Hobolt, & Wratil, 2017). With the ex-
pansion of common EU energy policy across different
policy areas, we expect to find growing polarization and
increasing numbers of dissenting votes. The analysis of
the Council´s voting records thus allows for tracing the
voting-behavior of the six CEE countries over time and
the level of regional homogeneity across policy issues.
As most decisions in the Council are adopted with
unanimous support, we focus on those cases where
Member States voted ‘no’ or abstained from voting. Fol-
lowing the common practice in the literature, we count
abstentions and outright ‘nos’ together, as the Mem-
ber States are often thought to avoid publicly opposing
the majority. The timeframe for our analysis runs from
2007 to 2018, marking the first decade when all six CEE
states were full members. Given that the latest available
Monthly Summary of Council Acts is from June 2018, we
cover the remaining period through 2018 by referring to
individual voting records available on the Council website.
Our sample of countries includes the four Visegrad states
(V4), which joined the EU in 2004, as well as Romania
and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007, and allows us to ac-
count for the possible influence of the date of accession
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on the voting behavior of the country. The six CEE coun-
tries were selected given their close coordination of posi-
tions on EU energy issues (Visegrad Group, 2014), their
broadly acknowledged reluctance towards more strin-
gent EU energy and climate policy, and their similarity
in terms of their economic models (Ćetković & Buzogány,
2016). Thus, we are interested inwhether, in such a seem-
ingly homogeneous block of countries, convergence or di-
vergence in voting behavior on EU energy issues can be
detected and to what extent domestic preferences might
help to explain the countries’ voting patterns.
4. Analysis
4.1. Voting Behavior in the Council
Altogether, in the period 2007–2018, we identified 67
decisions adopted by the Council on energy issues. Of
these 67 decisions, 23 were adopted without unani-
mous support. A list of these decisions is provided in
the Appendix. We are interested in the dynamics of en-
ergy policy-making during the last decade and focus both
on member state positions and on coalitions. The coali-
tion behavior of member states provides information on
the existence of similar preferences, even if similar vot-
ing positions might be based on different reasons. In
our data on voting in the Council, 39% of the decisions
were contested by a single state, 35% by coalitions of
two or three states, and 26% by coalitions with four or
more members.
The analysis of the Council’s voting records shows
that the six CEE countries have indeed most often been
members of the ‘coalition of unwilling’, either by directly
opposing or by abstaining from the majority position in
the Council on energy issues. However, not only is this
trend a relatively recent phenomenon which began in
2013, but, in addition, not all six CEE countries have ob-
jected to EU legislation on the same energy policy issues.
Figure 1 displays the total number of adopted pieces of
energy legislation in the studied period next to the num-
ber of pieces of energy legislation adopted without una-
nimity. The relative number of bills adoptedwithout una-
nimity has increased since 2015. Here, the comparison
between the year 2009 (adoption of the EU energy and
climate policy package 2020) and the year 2018 (adop-
tion of the EU energy and climate package 2030) is partic-
ularly illustrative.While in 2009 only one out of 13 pieces
of legislation failed to reach unanimous support, in 2018
only three out of nine bills were adopted by unanimity.
Figure 2 shows the number of dissenting votes of EU
member states for each year, differentiating between
the six CEE countries and other EU member states. Be-
tween 2007–2012, the six CEE members did not object
to any single piece of EU energy legislation adopted by
the Council. While there are several likely reasons for
this, including the relatively low salience of energy and
climate issues and the insufficient political power of CEE
countries as new members of the EU, two probable cen-
tral explanations are that the common EU energy and cli-
mate policy was initially not particularly ambitious and
CEE countries were able to receive concessions on many
important issues.
In the subsequent period 2013–2018, 17 Council de-
cisionswhichwere taken regarding energy legislation fea-
Figure 1. Total number of adopted EU energy legislative acts and the number of energy legislative acts adopted without
unanimity in the period 2007–2018. Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Monthly Summary of Council
Acts (https://www.consilium.europa.eu).
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Figure 2. Number of dissenting votes of EU members on EU energy legislative acts in the period 2007–2018. Source:
Authors’ calculation based on data from the Monthly Summary of Council Acts (https://www.consilium.europa.eu).
tured at least one abstention or a negative vote by a
member state. Of 17 cases adopted without unanimity,
16 involved at least one of the six CEE countries. Poland
has been the most prominent in objecting to the major-
ity position in the Council by participating in 10 out of
17 cases. Hungary objected seven times, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Czech Republic three times, and Bulgaria twice. No
distinctive trend can be noted between ‘older’ CEE EU
members (V4) and ‘newer’ ones (Bulgaria and Romania).
Poland and Hungary have consistently featured among
the dissenting voting group while other CEE members
have dissented less frequently.
Figure 3 depicts coalitions in the Council using social
network analysis. Nodes in the network represent coun-
tries while edges between them stand for commonly
voiced dissent. Countries with connections to many dis-
senters are located at the center of the graph,while coun-
tries that often form coalitions of dissent together are
closer to each other. The size of the nodes shows the
frequency of dissent, while the different colors stand for
the six CEE and ‘other’ member states. From Figure 3,
it becomes clear that there is a regional pattern of dis-
sent, with Poland, and to a lesser extent Hungary, play-
ing a central role. They are followed by several other CEE
countries. Interestingly, Slovakia and the Czech Republic
are on themargins of this network of dissenters. Another
much smaller and disconnected network of dissenters in-
cludes Germany, Finland, Estonia, Spain, and Portugal.
To grasp the potential differences in governments’
positions across different policy issues, we identified five
main issue areas among the contested legislation docu-
ments: 1) GHGemission reductions and ETS reform, 2) air
pollution, 3) renewable energy promotion, 4) energy ef-
ficiency, and 5) others, which do not belong to any of the
mentioned categories including, for instance, a decision
on the EU gas supply strategy or state aid for coal mines.
We are particularly interested in the dissenting votes of
the six CEE countries across issue areas. This data is pre-
sented in Figure 4. Overall, climate-related energy leg-
islation has been most often contested by some of the
six CEE governments alongside the legislation on air pol-
lution related to energy production. Legislation on GHG
emissions reductions, with seven cases, has dominated
the energy policy issues on which the six CEE countries
abstained or opposed the majority position in the Coun-
cil. Poland has been involved in all of the seven cases,
while Hungary joined in on two occasions and Romania
and Bulgaria each joined once in 2015. Air pollution has
been the second most controversial issue, with three
cases in total. Poland, Romania and Hungary objected to
air pollution legislation twice and Bulgaria once. On re-
newable energy promotion, three Council decisions have
been reached without unanimity, one objected to by
Poland and Hungary, the second by the Czech Republic,
and the third by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hun-
gary. Energy efficiency legislations have been opposed

























Figure 3. Coalitions of dissent in EU energy policies. Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Monthly Sum-
maries of Council Acts (https://www.consilium.europa.eu). The size of the nodes represents the number of dissenting
votes. The graph was made with Ucinet 6 and NetDraw 2.1 software.
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Figure 4. Dissenting votes of the six CEE countries by policy issue. Source: Authors’ calculation based onMonthly Summary
of Council Acts (https://www.consilium.europa.eu).
twice, once by Slovakia and once by Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. In the category ‘other’, we include a regu-
lation on the security of gas supply, opposed by Hungary.
Overall, three main observations can be made. First,
there is an obvious pattern of varying voting behavior
across different issue areas. Poland has been almost iso-
lated in continuously dissenting from the majority posi-
tion in the Council on GHG emissions reductions and ETS
reform.With regard to air pollution, the situation ismore
mixed with other countries, particularly Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, and Hungary, objecting to the Council’s majority po-
sition alongside Poland. The voting behavior of Slovakia
and the Czech Republic is particularly telling given that
the disagreements raised by these two countries have
been in the areas of renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency and do not match the voting pattern of the other
four CEE countries. Overall, the homogeneity in voting
behavior among the six CEE countries is low and, if any-
thing, issue specific. Second, there is a clear trend of in-
tensified objections raised by the six CEE governments
on various EU energy policy legislative acts since 2013. Fi-
nally, while several different coalitions of CEE countries
can be identified based on the specific issue area, it is
worth noting that Poland andHungary have been the two
CEE countries which have most often voted in the same
way in objection to the Council majority position.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 124–138 130
4.2. Political-Economic Interests and Developments in
the Energy Sectors in the Six CEE Countries
Although partly or fully state-owned energy utilities
still control significant shares of the market in Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia, many energy plants in CEE were
privatized as part of the privatization wave in the 1990’s
and 2000’s. The privatization trend has been reversing re-
cently and there has been a marked revival of state inter-
ventions in the energy sector in the last decade through
state acquisition of ownership over foreign energy com-
panies, regulation of energy prices, and negotiation of
large energy projects. This trend has been particularly ap-
parent in Hungary and Poland, and to a lesser extent in
Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, the state already owns
the majority share of the CEZ company, which is a key re-
gional market player in the electricity sector. In its energy
strategy published in 2012, the Hungarian government
announced that:
In the future we will make an effort to increase the in-
volvement of the public sector in the energy economy,
while obviously respecting competitive neutrality and
the rules demanded by a democratic society. (Hungar-
ian Ministry for National Development, 2012)
The Slovak prime minister Fico has also declared the am-
bition to re-seize control over the energy sector while
criticizing the privatization of the energy power under-
taken by the utility Slovenské elektrárne in 2006 (Reuters,
2017a). Such statements have been followed by concrete
actions. In 2017, aHungarian businessman close to Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán, Lőrinc Mészáros, together with
the Prague-based company EPH, bought shares of RWE
and EnBW in Mátrai Erőmű, the country’s largest lignite
coal power plant (Reuters, 2017b). In electricity distribu-
tion, in 2017, the state-owned company NKM Nemzeti
Közművek (formerly ENKSZ) completed the take-over of
the distribution company Démász from the French en-
ergy utility EdF and acquired stakes in two other elec-
tricity distributors owned by the German utility RWE
(Budapest Business Journal, 2017). In addition, the Hun-
garian government has introduced interventionist mea-
sures to cap energy prices below market levels (Interna-
tional Energy Agency, 2017). In 2015 in Slovakia, the Ital-
ian energy utility ENEL announced it was selling 66% of
its shares in Slovenské elektrárne to the Czech company
EPH. The Slovak government maintained 34% of shares
with the option to acquiremajority ownership in the elec-
tric power utility once two new nuclear power reactors
Mochovce 3 and 4 have been built (Velinger, 2015). The
samedevelopments have beenwitnessed in Poland since
2015, with four state-owned energy utilities acquiring
ownership and control over production facilities previ-
ously owned by foreign companies (Reuters, 2018). The
trend of an increasing state role in the energy sector has
been, however, far less prominent in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania where foreign companies continue to play impor-
tant role in the distribution and generation of electric-
ity. The new Romanian energy strategy, for instance, has
maintained the need for the state to preserve ownership
over some energy utilities, but it also stresses the prin-
ciple of market competition and clear division between
the state as a regulator and as a shareholder (Ministerul
Energiei, 2016).
Not only has the nature and scale of state interven-
tion in the energy sector varied across CEE countries—
the material base and industrial interests in the en-
ergy sector have exhibited important differences as well.
Poland, for instance, has by far themost carbon-intensive
electricity sector in the EU owing to the overreliance of
the energy industry on domestic coal (Moro & Lonza,
2018). The Czech Republic ranks second in terms of the
carbon intensity of its electricity sector (Moro & Lonza,
2018) but, interestingly, the state-owned CEZ company
which owns stakes in energy companies throughout the
region supports a more stringent ETS system. This is due
to the fact that CEZ is less carbon intensive than some
other major energy companies in Europe; thus, higher
carbon prices give the company a competitive advantage
in the short- and medium-term (CEZ Group, 2018). Bul-
garia and Romania rank third and fourth in terms of car-
bon intensity of electricity production, but their concerns
are aggravated by the high carbon intensity of their heat-
ing sectors as well as weaker economic development,
leading to a higher impact of increasing emissions stan-
dards on energy prices. Slovakia and Hungary have com-
paratively less carbon-intensive electricity due to the sig-
nificant role of nuclear and hydropower in their energy
mix (Moro & Lonza, 2018).
The levels of electricity prices, one of the main fac-
tors of competitiveness among the six CEE economies,
also display important differences. Concerning prices for
households, in the first half of 2018, Bulgaria had the low-
est prices while Czech Republic had the highest. For non-
households, Slovakia had the highest electricity prices
among the six CEE countries, which are above the EU av-
erage. The lowest non-household electricity prices are in
Czech Republic followed by Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
and Poland (Eurostat, 2018). The unusually high electric-
ity prices in Slovakia are due to various factors includ-
ing hidden subsidies for coal and nuclear power, renew-
able energy support, increasing carbon prices, and con-
siderable imports of energy sources and electricity (Slo-
vak Spectator, 2016). In Poland, the price of electricity for
non-households has increased recently and is expected
to be under further upward pressure due to rising car-
bon prices and reliance of the energy sector on coal as
the dominant source (Energy Transition, 2018).
5. Discussion
The presented data on voting behavior shows that there
is no strong coherence among the six CEE governments
in their positioning on EU energy-related legislation, and
it supports recent findings regarding the heterogenity
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in energy and climate policy preferences in the CEE re-
gion (Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017). However, our assess-
ment has not confirmed the existence of two blocks with
Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania on one side, and Hun-
gary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic on the other, as sug-
gested by Bocquillon and Maltby (2017). The differentia-
tion across issue areas reveals that a more issue-specific
approach is necessary to acquire deeper insights into the
voting behavior of the six CEE countires and possible mo-
tives behind it. If Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have dis-
played similar preferences, it has only been in the case
of air pollution legislation, where they are also accom-
panied by Hungary. In the area of GHG emissions and
ETS reform, Poland has been relatively isolated in its vot-
ing behavior, with only occasional support from Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Romania. Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic have revealed themselves to be outliers in the group,
with their oppostion in the Council primarily targeting en-
ergy efficiency and renewable energy legislations.
The differences in voting patterns across issue ar-
eas underline the importance of sector-specific domestic
preferences. Domestic political-economic interests are
particularly powerful in illuminating differences in the
voting behavior of the six CEE governments in the area
of GHG emissions and ETS reform. Poland has been the
most concerned party due to its heavy reliance on do-
mestic coal and has opposed virtually all decisions of
the Council on this matter (see also Skjærseth, 2018).
Other countries have expressed lesser concern while the
Czech Republic and Slovakia have not objected to any
of the legislation pieces in this field. The decisions of
the Czech government not to oppose the ETS reform has
been largely motivated by the increasing awareness of
the state-owned energy utility CEZ that higher carbon-
prices can strengthen the company’s competitiveness
on the regional market (see also Jevnaker & Wettestad,
2017). Bulgaria and Romania have received considerable
concessions from the EU in terms of free carbon per-
mits and additional funding for fossil-fuel district heat-
ing through the Modernization Fund, which successfully
moderated their opposition to the ETS reform. Vested
economic interests and governments’ concerns about in-
creasing energy prices can also account for the relatively
broad coalition of countries opposing higher air pollution
standards since most of the EU air pollution legislation
targets medium and large combustion plants operated
by large energy utilities.
The Czech Republic’s reluctance towards renewable
energy targets can be explained by CEZ’s concentrated
sectoral power and its clear preferences for protecting
themarket and developing nuclear energy. The Slovakian
and Hungarian governments have also advanced their
plans of using nuclear energy. While illiberal tendencies
in Hungary have likely decreased the government’s will-
ingness to open the domestic energy market to foreign
producers of renewable energy, the same has not oc-
curred in Poland, whose government has not opposed
the most recent renewable energy directive. Part of the
explanation may lie in the strategic decision of major
state and business actors in the energy sector. As pre-
viously mentioned, Hungary has initiated the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant (Paks II), which should pro-
vide low-carbon electricity to satisfy domestic demand,
while Polish decision-makers have increasingly been con-
sidering renewable energy, particularly onshore and off-
shorewind, in response to the rising costs of carbon emis-
sions from coal (Energy Transition, 2018). Bulgaria and
Romania also withstood from objecting to renewable en-
ergy legislation, which may be related to their less con-
centrated domestic energy business interests and higher
openness to foreign investments in renewable energy.
6. Conclusions
This article has set out to explore the question of
whether the six CEE countries have exhibited common
voting behavior on EU energy legislative acts in the
Council in the period 2007–2018. We also examined the
extent to which domestic institutions and actors (and
their preferences) can account for the voting patterns
of countries across different energy policy areas, and
what conclusions can be drawn from this to inform EU
decision-making and the future prospects of the EU en-
ergy union and decarbonization efforts. Five important
contributions to the literature and policy-oriented re-
search emerged from this analysis.
First, we have shown that, although the overall fre-
quency of dissenting votes by the six CEE countries on
energy legislative acts has increased in recent years, vot-
ing coalitions have varied across policy issues. There was
no common blocking coalition among the six CEE coun-
tries in the Council on the latest legislative pieces of the
EU energy and climate framework for 2030, which fa-
cilitated the political agreement for their adoption. Our
findings support evidence about differences in energy in-
terests among CEE countries advanced in recent studies
(Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017; Nosko & Mišík, 2017), but
provide more nuanced insights into the variation of vot-
ing and coalition patterns across major EU energy pol-
icy issues.
Second, we have illustrated the importance of do-
mestic state-market structures in affecting voting behav-
ior.While caution is necessary while drawing conclusions
about the possible influence of domestic interests on vot-
ing behavior given the lack of empirical data and variety
of factors at play, several important trends and plausi-
ble explanations have been suggested. Although all six
CEE countries are dependent on fossil-fuels, the extent
of this dependence and the interests and abilities of do-
mestic energy companies to reap benefits from the de-
carbonization process have led to different government
positions, as voting records on the ETS reform illustrates.
Furthermore,wehave highlighted the important trendof
increasing statism in the energy sectors associated with
the illiberal turn in several CEE countries.While this trend
is motivated by the protection of domestic energy com-
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panies and provision of cheaper energy prices, we have
not found a uniform immediate impact of this trend on
voting behavior. Poland and Hungary, the two countries
forming the region’s ‘illiberal avant-garde’, have indeed
displayed the most similar voting pattern among the six
CEE countries, but this trend has weakened recently, as
the case of the new Renewable Energy Directive shows.
We have proposed that the differences in strategic en-
ergy planning at the national level may account for this,
with Poland showing higher interest in renewable en-
ergy as an alternative to increasingly costly coal-based
electricity. These findings underline the necessity of pay-
ing closer attention to sectoral preferences (Mühlböck
& Tosun, 2017), as well as their interplay with EU policy
over time, in order to understand policy change and na-
tional governments’ preferences towards EU legislation.
Thirdly, our results confirm the growing trend of
contestation voting in the Council, already identified in
other EU policy areas such as justice and home affairs
(Roos, 2018). Even if political divisions regarding EU en-
ergy policies are intensifying, this does not necessarily
lead to gridlock or stagnation in the process of widen-
ing and deepening of EU energy policy, especially in
climate-related energy policy areas. Our analysis sug-
gests that shifting national preferences and weak issue-
specific coalitions within the six CEE countries have facil-
itated further EU integration.
Fourth, the step up in the ambition of the EU en-
ergy and climate policy package 2030, from the Guide-
line given by the European Council in 2014 to the fi-
nal formulation and adoption of the legislation in 2018,
somewhat downplays the prevailing notion about the in-
creasingly decisive role of top-level negotiations in the
European Council for EU decision-making (Bocquillon &
Dobbels, 2014).
Finally, and related to the previous point, it is worth
noting that the dissenting votes and written concerns on
the new EU Energy Efficiency Directive and Renewable
Energy Directive came not only from some of the six CEE
governments (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary),
but also frommember states including Belgium, Portugal,
andGermany (Council of the EU, 2018b, 2018c). This indi-
cates that individual national governments find it increas-
ingly difficult to influence the EU decision-making pro-
cess on energy issues and are faced with high adaptation
pressure. Thismay open up possibilities for a positive pol-
icy feedback loop and deeper structural changes. For ex-
ample, the increasing CO2 price through the reformed
ETS has already placed fossil-fuel industries and interests
under pressure, leading governments and businesses to
explore opportunities in low-carbon sectors. The ability
of relevant actors to link the benefits from new low-
carbon technologies to domestic objectives, such as job
creation, energy security, and decarbonization, will sig-
nificantly affect the prospect of national clean energy
transitions. The recent emphasis on residential solar PV
in the energy strategies of Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic (Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2014; Hungar-
ian Ministry of National Development, 2012), which res-
onate well with the goals of economic patriotism and do-
mestic value creation, shows the variety of possible pol-
icy framings which can facilitate domestic clean energy
transitions. On a more cautious note, the increasing role
of the state coupled with traditionally closed energy pol-
icy communities and democratic backsliding in several
CEE countries might hinder clean energy transition ef-
forts and EU energy market integration while strength-
ening the prospects for established energy sources such
as nuclear energy.
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